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ABSTRACT 
Web based email systems may be a source of pristine digital evidence because of 
the perceived difficulty of client tampering with messages stored inside the email 
account. We demonstrate that such assumption is wrong in the case of Windows 
Live Hotmail
®1
. Windows Live Mail
®1
 synchronises message on client-side 
computers with the Hotmail
®
 server, benefiting users wishing to synchronise their 
email accounts and personal devices. However, this synchronisation opens an 
exploit for wrongdoers to tamper with existing email messages and attachments as 
well as facilitating the insertion of fabricated messages. The exploit process 
enables persistent storage of tampered and fabricated messages on the Hotmail
®1
 
server. The exploitation favours both account owners and wrongdoers who gain 
unauthorised access of others’ accounts. Even if tampering were suspected, we 
anticipate some difficulties in validating messages to determine their reliability 
and relevance. We predict, with trepidation, that the exploit process will become 
commonplace and pose greater challenges to the cyber forensics examiner and 
                                                 
1 Hotmail®, Windows Live Hotmail® and Windows Live Mail® are the registered 
trademarks of Windows Corporation. 
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legal practitioner during investigations and legal proceedings. Regrettably, the 
exploit complements the existing arsenal of tools for email forgery. More 
ominously, it provides opportunity for traceless injection of illicit 
material/malware onto any machine synchronised with the Hotmail
®
 account. 
Keywords Digital evidence, evidence validation, Windows Live Mail
®
, email 
tampering, web-based email exploitation. 
1. INTRODUCTION 
Covert attacks to gain control over other users’ web-based email accounts for a 
range of illegal and unethical purposes is not a new or uncommon phenomenon 
(Florencio & Herley, 2007). Use of email systems to promulgate the spread of 
malicious software capable of breaching privacy, disabling individuals’ 
computers and networks, and a myriad of scams, are unwelcome but well-
entrenched phenomena (Sunner, 2005). Bogus email messages created with little 
technical skill can override email identity checking process, providing anonymity 
for the miscreants and when delivered can have disastrous outcomes for victims 
of such ploys (Levi & Koc, 2011). A significant vulnerability is poor password 
security measures used by email providers, aggravated by weak user passwords, 
which in turn facilitates, if not actually encourages exploitation of this essential 
communications medium (Craddock, 2011; Preibusch & Bonneau, 2010). 
The ability to access others’ email accounts allows intruders to create, delete, 
transmit, move and copy messages but little else. An intruder, or account holder 
wishing to modify an existing email message for some improper purpose may be 
able to export messages, modify them but then find it impossible to reinsert the 
emails into web-based accounts. It was considered difficult, if not impossible, to 
modify web-based email messages stored on vendors’ servers without direct 
access to the server by means other than the web page (Ardley, 2011).   
We became aware of a current criminal case
2
 during which the defendant 
suggested the possibility of the complainant tampering with messages received by 
the complainant from the defendant in a Hotmail
®
 web-based email account. The 
suggestion was this was done as a means to implicate the defendant in a criminal 
activity. Initially, the proposition seemed improbable because of perceived 
technical difficulties in editing message content and was dismissed by the 
prosecution team of cyber forensics experts as being technically beyond the 
ability of the average home computer user without advanced programming skills. 
Nevertheless, the defence, forensics team considered it was possible with an 
unknown but probably low level of difficulty, and further research would help to 
identify and test simple processes allowing authorised and unauthorised 
tampering of Hotmail
®
 messages to succeed.  
                                                 
2 
While the case is sub judice we are not permitted to identify the court or parties 
involved. 
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In this paper, we show that Windows Live Hotmail
®
 messages can be modified 
with a modicum of skill and that simple processes do exist to overcome 
export/import issues as well as obliterating traces of modification used in these 
processes. We observed that it was a relatively simple process to access and 
modify Hotmail
®
 messages by a non-technical forger using Windows Live Mail
®
 
(WLM); an unannounced vulnerability we contend existed since 2007. The 
processes we tested confirmed that it in some instances, it was possible to produce 
near perfect forgeries. We will demonstrate that a Windows Live Hotmail
®
 
account can be synchronised with WLM by the account holder but unlike the 
Hotmail
®
 account, WLM can be used to alter existing messages and insert 
fabricated messages into the Hotmail
®
 account stored on the Hotmail
®
 server.  
Reliance on Hotmail
®
 messages as unadulterated digital evidence is questionable, 
and confirmation of the WLM exploit means that some form of validation is 
required. If tampering evidence on the forger’s computer were purged, it is likely 
that the Hotmail
®
 server would provide the only possible means to detect and 
verify message tampering and fabrication. However, reliance on Internet Service 
Providers to provide full historical records of their client’s Hotmail® 
communications may prove disappointing to law enforcement agencies seeking 
confirmation of tampering and fabrication because of insufficient message 
logging. We note, for example that in contrast to its European and American 
counterparts, Australia does not require Internet Service Providers to maintain 
detailed logs of its users’ Internet activities including email messaging. Australia 
does not presently possess powerful legislative standards such as the European 
Telecommunications Standards Institute requiring service providers to retain 
significant sets of data on their clients that assist law enforcement in investigating 
crime and seeking exculpatory evidence to eliminate the innocent from their 
investigations (Attorney-General’s Department, 2010). 
Australia’s Telecommunications (Interception and Access) Act 1979 permits 
service providers to provide telecommunications data, including email data, to 
law enforcement agencies and  telecommunications data and related information 
kept for billing and other business purposes (Attorney-General’s Department, 
2010). Australian federal and state government laws do not mandate service 
providers to retain Internet data (e.g. SMTP records or mail client access other 
than authentication) and email providers are unlikely to record email logs for any 
length of time or hold sufficient data to validate suspect email messages. This 
apparent lack of data available from service provider logs to assist examination 
was further incentive to undertake our study to see what other evidence of 
tampering the WLM exploit might provide.  
Notwithstanding legislation empowering law enforcement agencies to obtain 
email records from email vendors in criminal investigations, it is not always so 
straightforward in civil cases.  In a 2008 civil trial (Alexander, 2008) a 
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Mississippi district court upheld the defendants’ right to seek the quashing of a 
court order by the other party seeking detail of the email accounts of the 
defendants’ employees. The court ruled that the relevant statute the third party, 
the email vendor, may not disclose such information in civil matters (Alexander, 
2008).  
We foresee that evidence obtained by forensics examiners from Windows Live 
Hotmail
®
 server logs that hitherto provided authoritative views on message 
antecedents and attributes might no longer be relied upon per se. Although email 
communications exploitation through a broad range of attacks has been present 
since its creation, we anticipate that WLM, while offering many benefits to its 
users, may be one of a number of applications inadvertently nurturing email 
forgery in a variety of forms.  
Although at the time of writing were unable to find any scientific literature on the 
WLM vulnerability or other exploits, we thought it prudent to publish and make 
aware those responsible for law enforcement and the courts that the integrity of 
web-based emails should not be taken at face value. We suggest that some means 
of validating email messages be applied when circumstances dictate or ideally, as 
a matter of standard forensics practice. We have also engaged with Microsoft via 
appropriate channels and received a reply that stated they were aware of the 
functionality of the application but that it was essential to, “. . . provide a more 
complete service to customers wanting email synchronized across multiple 
devices”, but Microsoft was unaware of the exploitation process per se (Ardley, 
2011, pp. 3-4).  
Of concern to us was whether email messages could be tampered with and 
fabricated messages could be inserted into a target Hotmail
®
 account using WLM. 
If so, certain criteria must establish alteration of the message content, the message 
headers and the message attachments as well as insertion of fabricated messages. 
It was necessary to establish that these changes would persist in the Hotmail
®
 
account linked to the server, not solely in the WLM account after an extended 
period
3
. To establish a proof of concept, we required certain conditions that would 
confirm conclusively the WLM exploit process, namely: 
1. Message content could be altered. 
2. Message headers could be altered. 
3. Message attachments could be altered. 
4. Fabricated messages could be inserted. 
 
This paper looks specifically at the current version of Windows Live Hotmail
®
, 
and the vulnerability of email messages for tampering. Time did not permit us to 
                                                 
3  An arbitrary eight week-period would demonstrate stability and 
persistence of the tampered messages on the Hotmail® sever over an 
extended period. 
Journal of Digital Forensics, Security and Law, Vol. 7(1) 
33 
undertake similar, detailed examinations using other web-based email 
applications, notably Gmail™, Yahoo 7 Mail®, AOL Mail4 or Outlook®5, but the 
results observed from exploratory examinations of these applications leads us to 
suspect that they too were vulnerable to tampering via WLM, and in the case of 
Outlook
®, through the simple ‘drag and drop’ migration process.  
In this paper, we outline the history and nature of Hotmail
®
, Windows Live 
Hotmail
®
 and WLM. We define and describe the process of the WLM exploit and 
the extent to which it can be used to modify Hotmail
®
 message content, headers 
and attachments. We describe how we tested the proof of concept and the 
outcomes, and how we compared the modifications with original email data. We 
also highlight the challenges to validating messages facing the cyber forensics 
practitioner 
2. SUMMARY OF HOTMAIL™ AND WINDOWS LIVE MAIL®  
Hotmail
®
, one of the pioneering web-based emails, was made available to the 
public free of charge in 1996 (Craddock, 2010a). In 2004, Hotmail
®
 was moved 
onto a system using Windows Server and Windows SQL Server
®
 and more 
recently upgraded to the latest version of SQL server (Craddock, 2010a). In 2007, 
Microsoft released a beta version of its free email application WLM to replace 
Outlook Express
®
 on Windows XP
®
 and Windows Mail
®
 on Windows Vista
®6
. 
WLM incorporated the DeltaSync
®5
 protocol enabling users to synchronise 
Hotmail
®
 and other email accounts with WLM (LeBlanc, 2007a, 2007b; Sierra, 
2010).  By 2010, Hotmail
®
 accounts synchronised with WLM offered users 
synchronicity between their PC email client, their browser, and their phone 
(Craddock, 2010b). There is evidence that Outlook
®
 has had a functional 
synchronisation for some time, perhaps preceding 2007 using WebDav (LeBlanc, 
2007b). 
When installed on a user’s computer under Vista® or Windows 7®, WLM 
typically creates a default directory named Windows Live Mail under the 
Microsoft folder in the nominated user’s Users folder. Users are able to add email 
accounts by using the menu feature in WLM, provided they add the email account 
name and password. Folders under Hotmail
®
 accounts are created in WLM, most 
usually, Inbox, Draft, Sent items, Junk email and Deleted items. This is very 
similar to some IMAP email-clients such as Thunderbird that provide similar 
directory structures and individual files.  
                                                 
4  Gmail is owned by Google Incorporated. Yahoo 7 Mail® is owned by Yahoo. AOL 
Mail is owned by AOL Incorporated. 
5
 Outlook
®
 is a registered trademark of Microsoft Corporation. 
6
  These applications and operating systems are registered trademarks of Microsoft 
Corporation. 
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3. THE PROCESSES INVOLVED IN THE WLM EXPLOIT 
Unlike its predecessors, Outlook Express
®
 and Windows Mail
®7
, which stored 
messages in less accessible formats and obscure folders, WLM folders are readily 
visible using Windows Explorer, for example, and each message can be opened, 
viewed, modified and saved using Notepad, and other text editing software. More 
remarkable is that when WLM is running, it is also possible to drag and copy 
email messages from any of the message folders to the desktop, edit the message 
in various ways, and drag the message back into WLM. This feature is not 
obvious to users and we do not believe it was intended to be part of the normal 
use of the application. It seemed likely that tampering of email messages could 
occur because of the way WLM stored messages from Hotmail
®
 accounts on the 
client machine and these messages would be migrated to the vendor server. If so, 
these changes were expected to persist server-side and may assist in detecting 
tampering. 
The account holder may access the Hotmail
®
 account either by direct access to the 
Hotmail
®
 account held on the server or by installing WLM and synchronising 
with the Hotmail
®
 account as shown in Figure 1a. Opening the Hotmail
®
 account 
by web access does not permit the user to tamper and insert a fabricated message 
into the account. However, accessing the Hotmail
®
 account through WLM 
facilitates exploitation and allows the account holder to alter existing sent and 
received messages for a variety of reasons.  
Figure 1b presents an alternative scenario is when an attacker gains access to the 
account holder’s computer and uses WLM to access the Hotmail® server and 
tamper with or insert messages. 
A remote attack is shown in Figure 2 where the attacker has the account holder’s 
account name and password. The attacker is able to access the Hotmail
®
 server by 
synchronising through WLM and tamper with and insert messages. 
                                                 
7 Outlook Express®, Outlook 2011® and Windows Mail® are registered trademarks of 
Microsoft Corporation. 
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Figure 1a.  The account user accesses the Hotmail
®
 server by direct access to 
the email account or uses WLM to synchronise and access the account. 
 
 
 
Figure 1b.  An attacker gains access to the account holder’s computer to 
tamper with or insert messages. 
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Figure 2. An attacker on a remote computer using WLM to synchronise with 
the account holder’s account on the Hotmail® server to tamper and insert 
messages.  
 
Figure 3 illustrates how WLM on an account holder’s computer synchronises 
with the Hotmail
®
 account held on the Hotmail
®
 server. The Hotmail
®
 account is 
added to WLM using the account name and password. The WLM account is 
opened on the account holder’s computer and a message selected for tampering is 
dragged from WLM by the ‘drag and drop’ facility and placed on the desktop and 
the original message in the account is deleted to conceal the forgery. The 
extracted message may be edited using a text editor such as Notepad then saved 
and dragged back into the account in WLM. The account is manually or 
automatically synchronised with the Hotmail
®
 server and the tampered message 
remains in the Hotmail
®
 account. 
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Figure 3. The sequence of events showing an account holder altering an 
existing email message. 
 
Similarly, in the event an attacker hijacks the account holder’s computer or 
initiates an attack from another computer, the attacker has the ability to access the 
account holder’s account through the WLM exploit either on the account holder’s 
computer or on the attacker’s computer, as shown in Figure 4. The process of 
message tampering and insertion is identical with the process illustrated in Figure 
3. 
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Figure 4. The sequence of events showing an attacker altering a message in 
account holder’s account. 
 
In the first two instances, evidence artifacts of tampering are confined to the 
account holder’s computer and the Hotmail® server. In the remote attack, 
evidence of tampering would be located on the attacker’s computer and the 
Hotmail
®
 server; server-side is dependent on appropriate server logs and retention 
periods of those logs.  
We discuss the issues of evidence location and characteristics in Section 8. 
4. APPLICATIONS USED AND PROCESSES UNDERTAKEN TO TEST 
THE PROOF OF CONCEPT 
For the proof of concept, we used a desktop computer running Windows 7 Home 
Premium
®
 operating system and Windows Live Mail 2011
®
 email application
8
. 
For ease of reference, we called this computer the ‘editing computer’. A second 
computer, the ‘independent computer’, compared and checked the outcomes 
obtained by the ‘editing computer’. Identical operating system and email 
                                                 
8 Windows 7 Home Premium® operating system is the registered 
trademark of Microsoft Corporation. 
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application were installed on the ‘independent computer’ as were used on the 
‘editing computer’. The use of the ‘independent computer’ would ensure that 
results observed on the ‘editing computer’ could be verified independently. The 
computer mouse was used to transfer twelve candidate message files (.eml) from 
the Hotmail
®
 account in WLM onto the ‘editing computer’ desktop and vice versa 
using a ‘drag and drop’ technique. Notepad was used to edit the extracted files 
and message files in the WLM folders present on the ‘editing computer’ directory.   
A Windows Live Hotmail
®
 account was created using the ‘editing computer’ for 
testing the processes and efficacy of message tampering. The account was 
populated with messages sent from other Windows Live Hotmail
®
, Gmail™, 
Yahoo 7 Mail
®
, AOL Mail, and POP3/SMTP accounts created specifically for the 
study on a separate computer. Email messages were sent from the Hotmail
®
 
account on the ‘editing computer’ to the other email accounts. These processes 
would enable later study of the characteristics of the tampered messages and 
fabricated messages located in the respective Inbox and Sent items folders on the 
‘editing computer’.  
WLM was installed and opened on the ‘editing computer’ where tampering and 
fabrication of messages would occur. The Hotmail
®
 account previously created 
for the purpose of the study was synchronised successfully with WLM on the 
‘editing computer’ and we noted confirmation during the account 
synchronisation, that the mail server was an HTTP server implementing 
DeltaSync
®
 version 2.0.0. We observed the same version of DeltaSync
®
 was 
installed during the installation of WLM on the ‘independent computer’.  
The study commenced with attempts to copy and modify email messages in the 
Inbox and Sent items folders on the ‘editing computer’ by dragging twelve 
prepared messages from each folder to the computer desktop to see whether 
tampering of the message content, headers and attachments were possible. 
Notepad was used to change headers and message content and then the messages 
were reinserted into the respective message folder, in some instances with the 
original message extant, in others with the message previously deleted. 
Observations would determine whether these processes resulted in persistence of 
the migrated file remaining in each message folder. On completion of each 
tampering process, hashes were taken of each file for later comparison during our 
study into the persistence of the messages in the Hotmail
®
 account and the 
Hotmail
®
 server. WLM was closed and the computer rebooted to determine 
whether the tampered messages persisted in the folders.  
We then studied the viability of tampering with extracted messages by 
substituting original image and text file attachments with previously prepared 
messages to facilitate the substitutions on the ‘editing computer’. We used 
Notepad to alter and insert the fabricated scripts into original messages, two in the 
Inbox folder and two in the Sent items folder. Once the substitution was 
completed, the messages were reinserted into their original folders onto the 
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‘editing computer’ using the ‘drag and drop’ process. We then manually 
synchronised WLM with the Hotmail
®
 server. 
To test whether fabricated messages could be inserted into WLM and 
synchronised with the Hotmail
®
 server, we used twelve messages from a different 
Hotmail
®
 account which we dragged to the ‘editing computer’ desktop then 
inserted them into the Inbox and Sent items folders of WLM, which was then 
synchronised with the server. Four of the messages contained image file 
attachments and the remaining four messages contained text file attachments.  
We also wished to observe whether the tampered and fabricated messages 
inserted into the WLM folders would synchronise and remain on the Hotmail
®
 
server. WLM was manually synchronised after each insertion and the ‘editing 
computer’ shut down and rebooted, WLM was opened and observations made of 
the presence and characteristics of the tampered and inserted messages to 
determine their persistence in WLM. This process was repeated by using a WLM 
account on the ‘independent computer’ to see whether the tampered message 
would populate WLM and to observe the characteristics of the messages. To 
determine whether the files had synchronised with the Hotmail
®
 server, we used 
the ‘editing computer’ and the ‘independent computer’ and opened the Hotmail® 
account to see whether the tampered files were present and observe their 
characteristics. We assumed that an eight week-period would be sufficient to 
confirm that the tampered files persisted on the Hotmail
®
 server.  
To gain more information about the DeltaSync
®
 synchronisation process, namely, 
the characteristics of the message metadata recorded on the Hotmail
®
 server, we 
simulated conditions of the DeltaSync
®
 synchronisation as closely as possible. 
DeltaSync
®
 is not freely available for use separate from Microsoft products
9
 and 
we were unable to identify the type of metadata stored on the Hotmail
®
 server. 
Consequently, we used the UNIX utility rsync as the nearest known 
approximation to DeltaSync
®
 to simulate and investigate the server-side actions.  
The X-Ways Forensics
©10
 analysis tool was used to locate and examine the folder 
and email message files and obtain file hashes for comparison and event 
reconstruction purposes. This provided confirmation of changes to tampered 
messages and proof of reinsertion into WLM and the Hotmail
®
 control account; 
physical examination of the computer directories providing more complete file 
attributes and antecedents. 
Forensics images were taken of the ‘editing computer’ after the tampering was 
completed and the WLM synchronisation with the Hotmail
®
 server completed, to 
observe and obtain the characteristics of the WLM folders and messages for signs 
                                                 
9 Note: DeltaSync® has been reverse engineered at the client side. 
10 X-Ways Forensics is the copyright of X-Ways Software Technology 
AG. 
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of tampering. Searches of tampering events and migrated message files were also 
made to see if any typical evidence artifacts were available to the forensics 
examiner. 
These tests were replicated using a ‘third computer’ with Windows XP® with 
Service Pack 2 installed and a compatible version of WLM. This would allow us 
to compare results obtained on the ‘third computer’ with the ‘editing computer’. 
Section 5 provides details of each examination and our observations so that the 
reader may also repeat the examinations themselves. 
5. TESTS OF WLM BEHAVIOUR DURING MESSAGE 
TAMPERING 
Question 1: Do tampered and inserted messages synchronise with the 
Hotmail
®
 server and persist server-side for an extended period?  
Test 1A:  Eight tampered messages and four fabricated messages were 
created on the ‘editing computer’ and were inserted into 
WLM then synchronised with the Hotmail
®
 server. The 
messages were hashed for later comparison and WLM was 
closed. Testing for synchronicity was carried out on the 
‘independent computer’ using Windows 7® and WLM 2011, 
by accessing the messages in WLM and the Hotmail
®
 
account. This would determine whether the tampered and 
fabricated messages persisted on the Hotmail
®
 server when 
accessed by the ‘independent computer’.  
 
Outcome 1A: Complete and permanent synchronisation of the tampered 
messages was observed. All tampered files were 
synchronised and hash values were found to be identical. The 
tampered messages persisted in the WLM account and on the 
Hotmail
®
 server for a period of eight weeks. 
 
Test 1B:  We attempted to replicate the DeltaSync
®
 synchronisation 
process on a server to identify the nature of the metadata 
synchronised between the server and WLM. This involved 
using a server to simulate what occurs on the Hotmail
®
 server 
after synchronisation with WLM using Microsoft’s 
DeltaSync
®
, running a similar application, rsync to simulate 
DeltaSync
®
 as close as possible, to identify the type of 
metadata synchronised. 
 
Outcome 1B: The rsync test showed that unlike Windows, which provides 
three distinct types of temporal metadata (created, modified 
and accessed), rsync preserves last modification time but 
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loses last access time. Modification is a combined creation 
and modified time, while accessed is displayed as an access 
time. Consequently, server-side metadata and logging is not 
expected to provide as much temporal metadata as stored in 
the WLM message folders. We recognise there are 
applications freely available that are capable of falsifying file 
metadata to assist camouflage client-side emails
11
. 
 
Question 2: Does WLM support the process of altering email message 
content?  
Test 2:  We added the Hotmail
®
 account to WLM on the ‘editing 
computer’. Twelve email messages from the WLM Inbox and 
Sent items folders were dragged onto the desktop. Each 
message was opened on the desktop with Notepad, the 
original message content was deleted and a substituted with a 
different message. Using Notepad, the message was then 
saved and reinserted into WLM. WLM was synchronised 
with the Hotmail
®
 server, closed and the computer rebooted.  
Outcome 2: WLM does support the process of altering message content. 
The tampered messages persisted in the WLM account and 
on the Hotmail
®
 server for a period of eight weeks. These 
results were confirmed by accessing the Hotmail
®
 server by 
the ‘independent computer’. 
   
Question 3: Does WLM support the process of altering email message 
headers?  
Test 3:  Twelve email messages were dragged to the desktop of the 
‘editing computer’ and Notepad was used to view and modify 
the message headers. The messages were then reinserted into 
their respective folders on the ‘editing computer’. WLM was 
closed and the computer rebooted. 
 
Outcome 3: WLM does support the process of altering message headers, 
notably message name, message timestamps, IP and SMTP 
data. The tampered messages persisted in the WLM account 
                                                 
11 For example, see: 
http://www.techrepublic.com/search?q=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.techre
public.com%2Farticle%2Fbuild-your-skills-learn-to-manipulate-file-
time-stamps-in-windows%2F5034280. 
Journal of Digital Forensics, Security and Law, Vol. 7(1) 
43 
and on the Hotmail
®
 server for a period of eight weeks. These 
results were confirmed by accessing the Hotmail
®
 server by 
the ‘independent computer’. 
 
Question 4: Does WLM support the process of altering email message 
attachments?  
Test 4:  During tests 2 and 3, we observed that it was possible to 
remove and modify message content script and presumably 
possible to remove message attachment script. We wished to 
confirm whether it was possible to replace the original 
attachment script with script from substitute attachments, 
specifically, picture image (.jpg) and Word 2010
®12
 
document files. To do so, we prepared four similar emails to 
the original sent and received messages so that we could 
simplify the substitution process by having available 
attachment data of the same format as the target message. We 
would then transfer that image and text file data by copy and 
paste into the original message using Notepad on the ‘editing 
computer’. WLM was closed and the computer rebooted. 
 
Outcome 4: WLM does support the process of deleting message 
attachments and substituting different attachments; notably 
text and image files. The tampered messages persisted in the 
WLM account and on the Hotmail
®
 server for a period of 
eight weeks. These results were confirmed by accessing the 
Hotmail
®
 server by the ‘independent computer’. 
 
Question 5: Does WLM support the insertion of fabricated messages?  
Test 5A:  Using a template from a different Hotmail
®
 account and 
mimicking the header and formatting of existing sent and 
received messages, four fresh messages were created and 
saved to the ‘editing computer’ desktop. The messages were 
then inserted into the Inbox and Sent Items folders of WLM, 
which was then synchronised with the server. 
 
Test 5B: We created a fabricated text message in Notepad and saved it 
on the desktop as an email message (.eml) to see whether the 
fabricated message could be dragged into WLM and 
synchronise with the Hotmail
®
 server. 
                                                 
12 Word 2010® is a registered trademark of Microsoft Corporation. 
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Outcomes 5A/B: WLM does support the process of inserting fabricated 
messages. The tampered messages persisted in the WLM 
account and on the Hotmail
®
 server for a period of eight 
weeks. These results were confirmed by accessing the 
Hotmail
®
 server by the ‘independent computer’. 
 
Identical outcomes were observed using the ‘third computer’ running Windows 
XP
®
 with Service Pack 2 and a compatible version of WLM.  
6. OTHER OBSERVATIONS 
During the course of the study, we recorded observations of additional details 
regarding tampering and insertion processes that provide an insight into the 
exploit process.  
Altering and creating message contents 
Using Notepad on the ‘editing computer’ during Test 2 to alter message content 
and save the files was a straightforward process only requiring the user to identify 
the message content and then substituting the new message by typing or pasting 
new text and saving the file. Identification of the message content in the original 
message was the first step so that it could be removed or altered, and with a little 
practice and intuition, might be considered that a task a novice user could 
complete successfully. Figure 5a shows a portion of the message script opened in 
Notepad with the message content ‘No attachment’ clearly displayed. Figure 5b 
illustrates the message content replaced with the word ‘substituted’. The file is 
saved in Notepad and dragged back into the WLM folder. These messages 
remained in the same form when viewed on the ‘independent computer’ when 
viewed in WLM and the Hotmail
®
 account. All tampered messages appeared 
authentic with no evidence of tampering inside the message script.   
Messages remaining on the ‘editing computer’ desktop were deleted and the 
Recycle Bin emptied. Recovery of erased messages was possible using the 
forensics recovery tool and would be of potential evidentiary value in verifying 
tampering. 
Altering and creating message names, timestamps and other header data 
During Test 3, the process of identifying the relevant timestamps within the 
extracted messages required some testing on the ‘editing computer’ to ensure that 
all relevant data was changed. This was important, as tampering would be evident 
if all temporal data, typically three date sets in the header, did not match and the 
reinserted file showed the original date and time in the folder view. Initially, some 
reinsertion attempts did fail because of difficulties identifying the header data; for 
example, Hotmail
®
 headers are different from Gmail, Yahoo etc. Perseverance 
and practice rewarded our efforts in identifying critical dates and times ensuring 
they were consistent with the original message format. These messages were 
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reinserted and did move to the intended new time-based order in the message 
folders in accordance with the changed dates and times. The files retained their 
position and format throughout the eight-week period.  
 
Figure 5a. Original ‘sent’ message with the string, “No Attachment” visible in 
two locations. 
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Figure 5b. Original message replaced with the tampered ‘sent’ message.  The 
string “substituted” visible at the same locations.  Note the date/time and 
message name changes. 
Changing the message name was a simpler process to master and it was possible 
to change all message names, which retained their status after reinsertion.  Figure 
6a shows the original message name ‘ORIGINAL.docx’, whereas Figure 6b 
shows the altered message name changed to ‘SUBSTITUTED 
DOCUMENT.docx’.  
Changing IP and SMTP data was a straightforward process although a forger 
would have to ensure that the altered data would enhance the forgery. For 
example, if a fabricated IP address was inserted this might reveal tampering and 
defeat the purpose of the forgery. If an attacker manipulated a message the 
metadata stored locally, the Modified, Accessed, Created times will change and 
be identifiable to a forensic examiner.  Specifically, those metadata would differ 
from the header information that is contained in the message when they should be 
in close approximation of one another.  
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From our observations, we identified and analysed groups of evidence artifacts 
created during the tampering processes on the ‘editing computer’. This included 
locating evidence of tampering and the use of the WLM exploit on the ‘editing 
computer’.  From the outset, it was evident that WLM logs, while a possible 
source of ‘tamper evidence’ may not always be available for examination if the 
forger removed traces of the application’s presence on a computer used to 
complete the tampering or fabrication. Similarly, effective erasure of email 
messages edited on the host computer desktop would leave little for the forensic 
examiner to use. 
 
Figure 6a. Original message showing text attachment script before alteration. 
 
 
Figure 6b. Tampered message with the document attachment script removed 
and replaced with a substitute document script. 
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We assume, based on the rsync test and the persistence of messages retained on 
the Hotmail
®
 server, that the server would retain creation/modified metadata 
when the message was synchronised on the Hotmail
®
 server. Whether the 
metadata would provide meaningful corroboration would require checking the 
metadata under legislative power or court order. This metadata may be the best 
means of authenticating messages timestamps by comparing them with server- 
side timestamps. That is, of course, provided the message was still stored on the 
server and whether correlating the timestamps was possible to provide meaningful 
analysis. 
It appears the messages headers scripts are persistent and remain with the message 
irrespective of synchronisation with the server. How reliable are the message 
header timestamps and can they be taken at face value?  Even if the message were 
authentic, the timestamps may be inaccurate because of a range of delays and 
transmission faults. Comparing the sent message header with the received 
message header would provide a means of triangulating the most reliable dispatch 
and receipt times. Comparing the messages with the server timestamps is also 
conditional on the correct interpretation of the timestamps.  Even if they do 
conflict with the message timestamps, it may suggest tampering or some other 
event.  The difficulty is the last accessed time is not overly helpful and the 
creation/modified timestamp metadata identified in the rsync test does not provide 
a log of original creation or modified events.  However, the creation/modified 
metadata used to compare the message timestamps would establish message 
authenticity. 
Deleting and substituting message attachments. 
Removing original attachments (Word 2010 documents and image files) from 
messages stored on the ‘editing computer’ and replacing them with substitute 
attachments initially appeared more challenging and time-consuming than 
replacing message and header scripts. Study of the attachment required 
confirmation of the start and end of the attachment scripts. Once located the 
attachment boundaries were identified it was a straightforward process to remove 
original scripts using Notepad. Figure 6a is a segment of an original message 
viewed in Notepad showing the start and end boundaries of the attachment script - 
a Word 2010
®
 document in this instance. Once removed, it was possible to copy 
and paste the substitute attachment script from a previously prepared message 
attachment into the tampered message. Figure 6b shows a segment of the 
substituted attachment script (Word 2010
®
) inserted into the message. 
Comparison of the hash values of all messages and attachments reinserted into 
WLM showed they maintained all their file characteristics. 
Ability to alter messages in the directory folder 
In a separate test using the ‘editing computer’, we noted that the WLM exploit did 
not support attempts to open and alter messages located in the computer directory 
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folders that were visible using Windows Explorer
®13
. While fabricated messages 
could be inserted and existing messages could be opened using Notepad, the 
messages did not synchronise with WLM and did not appear in the folders when 
viewed with WLM. None of these messages synchronised with the Hotmail
®
 
server because of the local synchronisation that only synchronises messages when 
WLM is run. 
Ability to create fabricated messages 
Test 5 showed that it was possible to create and insert fabricated messages by two 
different processes: by creating an email message, and by changing the file 
extension of a text document to .eml format.  Both processes provide the means to 
include malicious code into the message script and pose security threats to unwary 
recipients unprotected by malware filters.  
7. SUMMARY OF FINDINGS 
Our ability to manipulate and insert messages through WLM into the Hotmail
®
 
server established proof of concept of the exploit. Study of these processes 
showed that the exploit could be used for message tampering and the insertion of 
malicious code. Test 1 confirmed that the tampered messages with altered 
messages content persisted on the Hotmail
®
 server for the trial period of at least 
eight weeks.  
Tests 2, 3 and 4 show that WLM permits tampering through a simple ‘drag and 
drop’ message migration using a simple text editor. We observed the process 
failed repeatedly when attempting to tamper messages in the computer folder 
directory housing WLM files. Tampering with message content is a relatively 
simple process requiring relatively little knowledge. Changing file headers and 
removing and substituting attachments requires more knowledge, but no advanced 
computer skills. 
Test 5 confirmed the ability to create and insert fabricated messages into WLM 
and synchronise those messages with the Hotmail
®
 server through two different 
processes. The process of creating a fabricated message mimicking a genuine 
email required some practice, but was helped by using message templates 
matching message formatting to other email applications and not considered an 
insurmountable challenge to novice forgers. The process of changing file 
extensions to .eml was uncomplicated but their format was readily recognisable as 
fabricated messages. Of security concern is that this process permits the inserting 
of ‘zero-day’ code into a target computer. 
Time did not permit us to trial similar examinations with Gmail™, Yahoo 7 
Mail
®
 and AOLmail applications beyond some initial account creation in WLM 
and basic proof of concept trials.  Preliminary trialing did confirm that tampering 
                                                 
13 Windows Explorer® is a registered trademark of Microsoft 
Corporation. 
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was achieved to the same degree as with our earlier examinations of Hotmail
®
. 
Outlook 2010
®
 appeared to present a similar opportunity for a similar process to 
be exploited.      
There may be other applications, such as Mozilla Thunderbird that enables 
message tampering with similar results as WLM. We leave that to further research 
to clarify the possibility but consider it worthy of mention at this time. Similar 
attacks may be feasible against Gmail using IMAP. 
8. IMPLICATIONS FOR DIGITAL EVIDENCE ANALYSIS AND 
RELIABILITY 
Having established the vulnerability of various web-based email applications to 
tampering, we can envision serious third-party injection attacks. Consider a 
government official with home and office internet access. The attacker injects 
malware with appropriate social engineering tags inserted into the message and is 
synchronised to the investigator’s account as we have described previously. 
Custom code ('zero day') can pass virus scans and is later run by the investigator 
as a trusted programme potentially compromising the official’s home and office 
network. 
In another scenario, a vengeful, disgruntled client seeks to implicate a business 
provider and tampers with an existing email from the provider to discredit the 
latter. If the provider has no record to contradict the forgery, it may be 
burdensome if not impossible to support a counter-claim, for as we have shown, 
there may be a paucity of tampering evidence. 
A tampered email message could have serious implications for its victim as well 
as potential benefits for the forger. We assert that Hotmail
®
 messages tendered as 
evidence should not be accepted at face value if there were even the slightest 
doubts over their integrity; yet some form of validation is required. Validation 
requires confidence about inferences drawn from the evidence, in particular, 
verification of the domain where the evidence is created, processed and 
transferred (Boddington, Hobbs & Mann, 2008). As Boddington et al., (2008) 
assert, not only the validity of the evidence files but examination of the 
application and operating programs must be available for examination. Simply 
assuming an email message is authentic and relates to a critical date and time, 
without seeking some reasonable validation can be disastrous. Such expediency or 
inattention to detail, as Dardick (2010) points out, may involve faulty reasoning 
that fails to prove that the facts support the conclusions and only those 
conclusions. It was important to see whether forgeries and fabricated messages 
could be detected though. 
A potentially rich source of evidence is the directory folder and WLM but a 
perceptive forger may well deep erase traces of WLM, or it may be unavailable if 
the ‘editing computer is not located or its existence unknown. We assume, based 
on the rsync test and the persistence of messages retained on the Hotmail
®
 server, 
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that the server would retain creation/modified metadata when the message was 
synchronised on the Hotmail
®
 server. Whether the metadata would provide 
meaningful corroboration would require checking the metadata under legislative 
power or court order. This metadata may be the best means of authenticating 
message timestamps by comparing them with server-side timestamps, which 
depends on the message still being stored on the server and whether correlating 
the timestamps provides meaningful information to assist analysis.  
What concerns us, and should certainly be heeded by those with a vested interest 
in seeking the truth, is that while tampering may be suspected, the metadata 
available to support or refute assertions as to the message integrity may be scarce 
in cases where attempts have been made to camouflage the alterations. 
Government and private organisations often have in place email security and pre-
forensics strategies that record all received, sent and deleted messages on their 
own servers.  This would seem to be a wise precaution, because such strategies do 
save deleted messages for use in future investigations. Having an original 
message to compare with a tampered message may be a sound validation process. 
Otherwise, if an original message is no longer available there is nothing to 
challenge a tampered or fabricated message linked to the server with a wrongdoer 
exploiting an external Hotmail
®
 account.  
Further research would be helpful to understand more fully, what useful server-
side evidence is available to the forensic practitioner. Equally important would be 
a reliable, formal validation template to help the forensics practitioner examine 
suspect messages. Given the large number of email clients in use, the question of 
email aggregation playing a role in this type of exploit should also be 
considered. The WLM exploit may be prevented by administration through one of 
the other email clients, and since the exploit deals with the messages maintained 
on the account holder’s computer and their synchronization to the Hotmail® 
server, this raise the question of whether this can be bypassed by using another 
client.  While the main focus of this paper is on WLM and how it stores 
messages, these other aspects warrant further consideration. 
9. CONCLUSIONS 
The results of this study may well have implications for cyber forensics examiners 
and legal practitioners preparing cases involving email evidence. We have shown 
that WLM facilitates forgery and requires little computer skill to fulfill improper 
or mischievous aims. Validation of email messages should be undertaken 
whenever there is a suspicion of, or claim of tampering is implicit. This requires 
access to email message metadata server side and from likely venues where 
WLM was used to undertake tampering. 
This confirmation of the WLM process to edit and exploit web-based emails 
persuaded us to bring this to the attention of law enforcement authorities. We 
hope it will assist forensics examiners in considering the possibility of message 
tampering in future cases and perhaps review some existing and previous cases 
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where incorrect assumptions were made regarding the authenticity of email-based 
digital evidence.  
Assuming the server side messages are stored in some sort of database (and a 
reasonably complex one we assume), the problem could be fixed by removing 
updates to message bodies and attachments within the server side database, so that 
when synchronisation occurs, only the entire email can be removed or deleted, 
rather than updated.  The implications of the WLM exploit process should be 
considered by Microsoft and fixed.  
Civil, criminal and internal disciplinary cases involving emails are not novel and 
occur with increasing sophistication. We predict cases of tampering will come to 
public note more often in the future. Pandora’s email box is now opening and 
legal cases relying on email evidence should be cognisant of the danger of 
assuming the obvious. Prudence suggests circumspection of the circumstantial.   
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